Summary
One goal of experimental economics is to provide data to identify models that best describe the behavior of experimental subjects and, more generally, human economic behavior. We discuss here what we think are the three main steps required to make experimental investigations of economic games as statistically informative as possible: finding the solution of the experimental game under the postulated equilibrium or other economic models, selecting from a potential class of experimental designs the optimal one for discriminating between those models, and choosing an optimal stopping rule that indicates when to stop sampling data and accept one model as the best explanation of the data. Each step can be computationally intensive. We offer an algorithmic presentation of the necessary computations in each of the three steps and illustrate these procedures by examples from our research on learning models in experimental games with incomplete information. These three steps of experimental design and analysis are not limited to experimental games, but the computational burden of implementing these algorithms in other experimental environments&mdash;for example, market experiments&mdash;requires further considerations with which we have not dealt.
Introduction
We shall take as primitives a class of theoretical hypotheses regarding the behavior of experimental subjects and a class of economic environments in which those hypotheses are to be tested. Our primary goal is to optimally design experimental studies to discriminate between the primitive collection of hypotheses and analyze the data produced by those experiments. There are a variety of reasons for optimizing the experimental design. The most obvious is that experiments are costly. Moreover, some experimental designs may discriminate between models so poorly as to render them useless, even if the budget constraints on experimental funds were not binding. We recognize three distinct steps for proceeding from the primitive class of possible experiments and class of rival theoretical models for predicting choice behavior in each of the possible experimental environments, to selecting an optimal experimental design.
The first step is to derive the statistical predictions of each of the rival hypotheses in each of the potential experimental designs. This involves computing for each model and experimental design a likelihood function that assigns to each possible data point which we can observe under our design the probability that that data point was generated by this particular model. This is typically not a simple exercise. Since simple economic models with perfectly rational agents often make predictions that are too sharp, the use of those models can lead to the zero likelihood problem: It is possible that we observe data that all of our models predict could never happen (e.g., subjects choosing strictly dominated actions). Ad hoc procedures such as discarding the zerolikelihood data points defy the likelihood principle and are incompatible with the application of the statistical approach to design optimization and data analysis that it requires. We therefore must adapt all of the models so that they assign positive probability (likelihood) The existence of such a value function uses the fact that the operator T, defined by satisfies monotonicity and discounting, and hence is a contraction mapping (Blackwell, 1965 McKelvey, 1990) If all players were perfectly rational, then all four stage games would end in the red players taking on the first round. If perfect rationality is not assumed, the problem becomes much more complicated (e.g., see Binmore, 1989; Reny, 1993; Rosenthal, 1982; Aumann, 1988; Kreps et al., 1982 poorly suited for locating the fixed point strategies (equilibria) for similar problems.
Optimal Experimental Design
In the previous section, we discussed the general numerical methodology of finding equilibria to experimental games under models that allow all observable data samples to occur with positive probability. Now, given the class of models in question, the equilibria under these models give us likelihood functions for observable data from a variety of experimental designs. In the experimental design stage, we can invoke statistical notions of optimal design to discriminate between the given class of models. To make our discussion concrete, let us assume that we have a class of experiments parameterized by some parameter vector a. Typically, out will correspond to payoff structures, probability distributions on payoff relevant state spaces, etc. Then, the optimal experimental design problem is the problem of finding the optimal value of a to use in our experiments.
Let X be the space of all possible data sets under all of our designs. Denote a typical data set by x. Let the likelihoods of a given data set x E X under design out for each of our n competing models be 1, (x; a) The two models we consider here differ in that one allows the subjects to use Bayesian updating between rounds to learn about the true game that is being played, and the other does not. Of the six models in El-Gamal and Palfrey (1993) , these models are labeled UF for unsophisticated with fast updating and UN for unsophisticated with no updating. We impose priors on the nuisance parameters (eo, K) by first deciding on the supports being Eo E [0, 1] and K E [0, 0.3] (K = 0.3 corresponds to e jo = F-0/20), and then making our priors uniform over those supports. Using those priors and the equilibrium behavior under our two models, we can construct the likelihood functions for all possible data sets and compute the information numbers as discussed earlier in this section. The optimal design for distinguishing between our two models was found to be 1T = 1/6 and b = 0.2. The contours of the information surface as a function of (,7T, b) between the two given models are shown in Figure 8 .
After running an experimental session with 16 subjects, the posterior odds ratio between those two models was still very close to 1, but our posteriors on Eo and K had changed considerably, concentrating most of the mass near Eo = 0.7 and K = 0.1. When we recomputed the information surface with those new parameters, the optimal design turned out to be 1T = 0.2 and b = 0.4.
The contours of the information surface with the posteriors on Eo and K are shown in Figure 9 . We used that second design in an experimental session with 10 subjects, and the result was a posterior odds between the two models of the order 10~ in favor of the model with no updating. In fact, we found the unsophisticated model with no updating to be the best of all six models we analyzed in El-Gamal and Palfrey (1993) Chernoff, 1972, chapters 11,12, and Berger, 1985 (Chernoff, 1972, pp. 59 Figure  10 . To make the plot more symmetric, we plot 10 times logarithm of base 10 of' the posterior odds ratio and stopping boundaries. The vertical lines correspond to experimental sessions, and the gray lines indicate that the first three sessions were inherited from an earlier design. We had started with the model of rationality discussed above but found that the given design, together with those models, was uninformative. We therefore switched to the model of rationality described in this section, reanalyzed the old data, and continued sampling until we accepted one of the two models. For more details on the decision to change our models of irrationality, see El-Gamal, McKelvey, and Palfrey (1993b) 
